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Abstract: In the last couple of years, the EU’s foreign policy was mainly directed 
towards two regions: the Balkans and the Eastern neighborhood. However, the 
means and the ends of the EU’s approach were in a sharp contrast. While the 
Balkan countries witnessed a more straightforward and coherent path towards the 
EU, the Eastern neighborhood had a different experience. Aiming to avoid future 
cleavages, the EU developed in 2004 the European Neighborhood Policy. But 
following Romania and Bulgaria’s accession in the EU, there was still the need for 
a more comprehensive approach toward the Eastern neighbourhood. Therefore, at 
the Polish and Swedish overture, the EU inaugurated the Eastern Partnership 
program which comprises of six ex-Soviet countries.  However, the Vilnius Summit 
was not as effective as it was expected. Instead, it has failed to address the major 
issues on the agenda. Considering these aspects, this paper asserts that the EU’s 
gaps in its approach toward the Eastern neighbourhood where mainly determined 
by systemic incentives and constraints as polarity and ordering principle. After 
laying out the core arguments, the paper will further develop possible future 
dynamics concerning the fate of the EU Eastern neighbourhood in the aftermath of 
the Vilnius Summit. 
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Introduction 
Foreign policy is one of the most important challenges for the European 
Union (EU). Throughout the years, the EU’s member states succeeded in achieving 
some internal consensus on the integration process. However, in the foreign policy 
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area the road proved not to be a smooth sailing; it was rather paved with 
roadblocks and inconsistencies. Even if there were some attempts to coalesce a 
unitary perspective, at the conceptual level, the EU’s foreign policy is still in an 
embryonic stage.  
Starting from these assumptions, this paper aims to offer a cogent 
perspective on the EU’s policy towards the Eastern European
1
 and South 
Caucasus
2
 states and its flaws. The starting hypothesis of the paper is that the EU’s 
gaps in its approach towards the Eastern neighbourhood where mainly caused by 
systemic incentives and constraints as polarity and the ordering principle
3
. 
Therefore, in the first part of the paper, there will be exposed a parallel 
conception on the EU’s approach towards the Western Balkans and the Eastern 
neighbourhood in order to highlight the crucial importance of the internal 
mechanisms and political will for the EU’s foreign policy. In the second part, there 
will be discussed three structural arguments that are supporting the paper’s 
hypothesis: Russia’s relations with EU’s Great power States (polarity), the futility 
of the Eastern Partnership endorsement (lack of polarity) and the neo-medieval 
characteristics of the EU (ordering principle). In the last part, the paper will further 
develop possible future dynamics concerning the fate of the Eastern 
neighbourhood in the aftermath of the Vilnius Summit. 
1. The EU: Anthitetic Foreign Policy 
1.1. The approach towards the Balkan states 
EU’s stance towards the Balkans can be conceived through two different 
periods of time: from 1990 to 2003 and from 2003 until the present. The first 
period consists of a rather lethargic approach, without a clear sense of leadership 
and firmness. This passive stance can be revealed through the wars between Serbia 
and Croatia, the Bosnian War and even the Kosovo War. In this sensible and tragic 
instances, the EU lacked cohesion and coherence. Its impact was marginal, and the 
United States played the most important role, especially in the Bosnian War and in 
the Kosovo War. The third ‘Springtime of the Peoples’ was not to be a peaceful 
                                                
1
 Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Belarus. 
2
 Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. From now on, this paper will refer to the six mentioned 
countries as the Eastern neighbourhood.    
3
 Kenneth Waltz, Teoria Politicii Internaionale, Iai, Polirom, 2006, pp. 130-143. 
E	<=	

131 

and joyful moment for the Balkans, but a moment of upheavals and ethnic 
cleansing and the EU was not able to have a certain stance toward the events that 
were happening in its ‘backyard’. The EU rather contained the Balkans through a 
‘cordon sanitaire’ which was best revealed through the Balladur initiative
4
. 
Though between 1990 and 2003, the EU was not resolute and lacked any 
robust action towards the Balkans from 2003 Brussels took a different track.  EU’s 
new posture towards the Balkans is best shown through the Thessaloniki 
declaration that was issued at the EU-Western Balkans Summit from June 2003. At 
the Summit participated all the Heads of States and Governments of the EU states 
and the representatives of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. In the second point of 
the declaration, the EU’s representatives made a clear proposal towards the 
Balkans. For the first time the EU expressed its ‘unequivocal support to the 
European perspective of the Western Balkan countries. The future of the Balkans 
is within the EU’
5
. Even if the initiative was perceived as utopian and it had many 
roadblocks in practice, it had the ability to pacify the region and offer a sense of 
direction. Briefly said, the declaration offered a teleological perspective that 
fulfilled the needs of the parties involved: the EU wanted peace and stability while 
the states of the Balkans wanted peace and prosperity
6
.  
Even if at the beginning of the 90’s, the EU was not effective in its approach 
towards the Balkans, in 2003, once the Thessaloniki Declaration was issued, it had 
succeeded in pacifying the region and also to gain a broader leverage on the 
                                                
4
 ‘The Balladur’s idea was to agree upon a pact preserving the stability of borders, rejecting 
territorial  claims  and  respecting  minority  rights  to  be  signed  by  all  interested  or  potential  
candidate countries  of  the  EU.  Few  months  later,  the  EU  members  states finalized  the  
Balladur  plan  and approved  in  Copenhagen  the  three  famous  criteria  for  submitting  
applications  for  membership: as known,  the  first  one  of  these  criteria  was  particularly  
devoted  to  the  rule  of  law,  democracy  and minority protection’. See,  S. Bianchini, 
“Reassessing Self-determination. European integration and Nation-state Independence facing the 
Challenges of post-Socialist Europe”, in Bianchini, S. (ed.) Self-determination and sovereignty in 
Europe: From historical legacies to the EU external role, Ravenna, Italy, Longo, 2013, p.257. 
Also, see Dorin Dolghi, Federica Oliva, “The Integration of the Western Balkans in the EU. A 
Securitization Approach”, Eurolimes, vol. 12, Institute for Euroregional Studies, Oradea-Debrecen, 
2011, p. 107. 
5
 “Thessaloniki Declaration”, 2003, 2
nd
paragraph, accessed on 26/04/2014 at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm.    
6
 Miranda Sabriu, “The Integration of the Western Balkans - A Need for Stability and Peace”, 
International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, vol. 3, no. 10, 2013, 
p. 71. 
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relations within the Balkans. It is true that there were not radical changes short 
after the Summit from 2003, but the bottom line is that a firm approach like the 
one from Thessaloniki in 2003 had the power to eradicate the main issues of the 
Balkans that were war, ethnic belligerence and deep society polarization. The EU 
also persuaded the Balkan countries that its post-Westphalian political-economic 
model is better than a state-centric and ethnic exclusivist model. Thus, even if, the 
June 2003 Thessaloniki European Council recognized the Western Balkans states 
as potential candidate states, it did not do the same for the Former Soviet 
Republics
7
. 
1.2 The approach toward the Eastern neighbourhood 
Following the last rounds of enlargement, the EU found itself in a new 
environment with different neighbours. The EU gradually started to realize the 
need to articulate its interests in the region by establishing a coherent policy 
framework toward its Eastern neighbourhood, in order to avoid ‘drawing new 
dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond 
the new borders of the Union’
8
. Thus, based on the values of democracy, rule of 
law and respect of human rights, the EU developed in 2004 the European 
Neighbourhood Policy which comprises 16 countries: Algeria, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Republic of 
Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine
9
. The European 
Neighbourhood Policy was created with the aim of promoting good governance 
and social development in the Eastern neighbourhood, without offering to the 
participating countries the possibility of accession. In other words, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy is not about enlargement, but rather about partial economic 
integration, closer political links, assistance with economic and social reforms and 
support to meet the EU standards
10
.   
                                                
7
 A. Verdun, G. Chira, “The Eastern Partnership: The burial ground of enlargement hopes?”, 
Comparative European Politics, vol. 9, no. 4/5, 2011, p. 450. 
8
 “Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours”, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
2003, p. 4, accessed on April 2014 at http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/communication-
commission-wider-europe%E2%80%94-neighbourhood-new-framework-relations-our-eastern-and. 
9
EU External Action, What is the European Neighbourhood Policy?,  accessed on April 2014 at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm.  
10
Ibidem.  
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In 2008, the EU’s first initiative was complemented by the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED), formerly known as the Barcelona 
Process and by the Black Sea Synergy. One year later, at the Polish and Swedish 
overture, the EU inaugurated the Eastern Partnership program which comprises of 
six ex-Soviet countries. 
The Eastern Partnership initiative is ‘a genuine and long-term partnership the 
EU is seeking to build with the neighbour states for their mutual development, 
stability and security, making the countries involved fully realize the benefits of 
being part of a larger Europe’
11
. The European Neighbourhood Policy and the 
Eastern Partnership are complementary and inclusive projects, created with the aim 
of giving to the partner countries and their people choices and opportunities for the 
future. The Eastern Partnership is a policy based on a differentiated approach with 
each partner, thus providing flexibility because it is dedicated to support each 
individual country to progress in its own way and at its own speed
12
.  
The year 2013 was a crucial one for the EU’s Eastern Partnership program. 
Commentators and EU politicians underlined that the November Eastern 
Partnership Summit in Vilnius should bring tangible results for the program. In 
other words, the Vilnius Summit was a very important opportunity to assess the 
stage of the Eastern Partnership program. But the reality showed the EU’s Eastern 
Partnership initiative has experienced a serious setback at the Vilnius Summit. 
Among the six Eastern Partnership countries, only Republic of Moldova and 
Georgia initialed Association Agreements with the EU, including the DCFTA. The 
negative responses of Ukraine and Armenia to the EU’s offer of Association 
Agreements and the lack of interest of Azerbaijan in adopting a DCFTA attracted a 
number of critics. Moreover, there were analysts who described the Eastern 
Partnership as being a failure and went on by asserting that ‘it is high time to start 
a real partnership’
13
. 
                                                
11
 Mihail E. Ionescu, “Conclusion”, in Ionescu, M. E. (ed.), The Eastern Partnership: the road so 
far, Bucureti, Editura Militar, 2013, p. 370. 
12
 Y. Tsantoulis, Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership: Different Centres of Gravity, 
Complementarity or Confusing Signals?, International Centre for Black Sea Studies, Policy Brief, 
No. 12, 2013, pp. 1-10, accessed on April 2014 at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publicatio 
ns/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=104869. 
13
 P. D. Wi2niewski, The Eastern Partnership – It is High Time to Start a Real ‘Partnership’, 2013, 
accessed on April 2014 at http://carnegie.ru/2013/11/20/eastern-partnership-it-is-high-time-to-start-
real-partnership/gu8o#. 
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After the results of the Vilnius Summit, many commentators expressed the 
opinion that the Eastern Partnership proved to be too technical, ignoring the 
proximity and influence of Russia, disregarding the differences between the six 
countries (although they share the same past as post-Soviet countries) and 
neglecting the characteristics of the Eastern neighbourhood as a whole (a highly 
diverse, volatile and unpredictable region, including political transitions, 
geopolitical competition, inter-state and intra-state wars and economic and political 
problems). At the same, the Vilnius Summit was an incentive for the EU to ‘reset 
or rethink’ its approach towards the Eastern neighbourhood, by finding first the 
answer to the question ‘what went wrong?’   
2. Structural Causes: External Effects 
One of the endogenous structural factors which influence EU’s approach and 
decisions toward the Eastern neighbourhood is the relations between the leading 
European states and Russia. The relations between European Great Powers like 
Germany or France with another Great Power which is Russia undermines the 
effectiveness and coherence of the EU. The EU has different approaches on 
Russia, because of the member states’ business interests and priorities. In this 
sense, Germany’s relation with Russia has always been a subject of discussion.  
‘Change through rapprochement’ (Wandel durch Annäherung) or ‘change 
through interweavement’ (Wandel durch Verflechtung) are concepts which played 
an important role in Germany’s foreign policy. The classic principles of 
“Ostpolitik” applied by Germany led to the adoption of a co-operative policy with 
Russia. Today, the results of this kind of policy formed a symbiotic relationship 
between Germany and Russia or an interdependence between politics and business 
backed by economic interests
14
. For example, ‘the annual trade volume between 
the two was a nearly balanced €76.5 billion in 2013 and according to Rainer 
Lindner, Director of the Ostausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft, 300,000 German 
jobs depend on business with Russia’
15
. Moreover, Germany is highly dependent 
                                                
14
 S. Meister, Reframing Germany’s Russia policy – an opportunity for the EU, European Council 
of Foreign Relations, Policy Brief, 2014, pp. 1-12, accessed on April 2014 at 
http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR100_GERMANY_RUSSIA_BRIEF_AW.pdf. 
15
 A. Härtel, Germany and the Crisis in Ukraine: Divided over Moscow?, Elcano Royal Institute 
Analyses, ARI issue 24, 2014, p.5, accessed on May 2014 at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library 
/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=180209. 
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on Russian oil and gas. ‘Russia provides 38 percent of Germany's natural gas 
imports, 35 percent of all oil imports and 25 percent of coal imports, covering a 
quarter of the country's entire energy needs’
16
. 
Another argument could be Europe’s dependence on Russia’s gas and 
Europe’s role as Russia’s largest gas market. Europe as a whole is a major 
importer of natural gas and Russia remains one of Europe’s most important natural 
gas suppliers. Russia is currently the dominant supplier of natural gas to Europe, 
accounting for about one-quarter of the EU’s natural gas supplies. But the 
dependency does not go only in one direction, because Europe is also the most 
important market for Russia’s natural gas exports
17
. Energy becomes a useful 
political tool for Russia using Europe’s dependency on its resources to influence 
decision making processes and to extract political concessions
18
. In this context, 
Heydar Aliyev’s words – Oil is money, gas is politics – could be relevant
19
.  
A second fact that reveals another flaw of the EU’s approach toward its 
Eastern neighbourhood consists of the political will behind the Eastern Partnership. 
Even if the Eastern Partnership was a cornerstone of the EU’s foreign policy, it 
lacked comprehensive and consistent endorsement from the leading EU member 
states. In structural terms, there was an absence of polarity, because the Eastern 
Partnership program was not endorsed by one or two Great Powers within the EU.  
The Eastern Partnership program was an EU initiative backed by Sweden 
and Poland, not key members of the EU, as Germany or France were. Therefore, it 
was not the result of a unitary consensus among all the EU member states. After 
Romania and Bulgaria’s accession in the EU, the process of European integration 
reached the Black Sea and led to the establishment of new neighbours. At the same 
time, the initial ENP was not functioning the way the European member states 
thought it would. The idea of incorporating Mediterranean countries and Eastern 
European/South Caucasus countries under the same ‘umbrella’ showed to be 
                                                
16
 K. Deuse, “Just how important is Russian gas for Europe?”, Deutsche Welle, 2014, accessed on 
May 2014 at http://www.dw.de/just-how-important-is-russian-gas-for-europe/a-17574004. 
17
 M. Ratner et al., Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply 
Diversification, Congressional Research Service Report, 2013, pp. 1-19, accessed on April 2014 at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42405.pdf.  
18
 R. Kaplan, E. Chausovsky, Pipelines of Empire, 2013, accessed on April 2014 at 
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/threats-russia-natural-gas-monopoly-lng-pipelines.   
19
 Heydar Aliyev was the third President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
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effective. The two groups of states were too different from social, political and 
economic point of views.  
The ineffectiveness of the European Neighbourhood Policy revealed by the 
lack of progress concerning democratization or economic stabilization and 
supplemented by the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine or the Russian-
Georgian war from 2008, forced the EU member states to find ways to reform the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. This approach was not an easy one, due to the 
fact that each proposal needed to gain support from Germany or France, which 
advocated ‘Russia first’ principle in building relations with the Eastern 
neighbours
20
. In other words, the states from that part of the world were perceived 
by Germany and France particularly from the perspective of building relations with 
Russia, which remained EU’s strategic goal.
Within the new environment and situation, Poland felt the opportunity to get 
involved in the shaping of the Eastern dimension of the EU. One of the aims was 
preventing the erecting of new barriers and divisions near the EU’s Eastern border. 
At the same time, Poland tried to promote and support its Eastern neighbours. 
Thus, in May 2008, Poland, enjoying Sweden’s support too, proposed the Eastern 
Partnership project to the EU member states. It would function within the 
framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, but with the particularity of 
involving only six countries: three from Eastern European and three from South 
Caucasus. 
This kind of approach was assessed by experts as being characteristic for 
Poland’s foreign policy, which tried to put a special attention on the unequal 
treatment of Southern and Eastern EU neighbours. Poland and Sweden claimed 
that ‘if the EU is going to strengthen its co-operation and support within the 
southern dimension, there will be a strong need to balance these steps by 
emphasizing also the eastern dimension’
21
.
A third perspective encompasses a rather theoretic approach toward the 
causes of inconclusiveness of the EU towards the Former Soviet Republics.  This 
                                                
20
 A. Adamczyk, “The Role of Poland in the Creation Process of the Eastern Partnership”, 
Yearbook of Polish European Studies, 2010, p. 196, accessed on April 2014 at 
http://www.ce.uw.edu.pl/pliki/pw/y13_adamczyk.pdf.  
21
 M. Łapczy3ski, “The EU’s Eastern Partnership: Chances and Perspectives”, Caucasian Review of 
International Affairs, Vol. 3, no. 2, 2009, pp. 143-155, accessed on April 2014 at http://www.cria-
online.org/7_3.html#_ftn20.   
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perspective underlines the presence of a neo-medieval order that impedes a 
coherent and robust approach of the EU towards the Former Soviet Republics from 
its vicinity. Neo-medievalism is defined as a system of overlapping authority and 
multiple loyalties, held together by a duality of competing universalistic claims
22
. 
Therefore, this argument refers to the ordering principle of the structure. 
The neo-medievalist Europe consists of two main antithetic and conflicting 
dynamics. The first dynamic consists of an integrationist one where the borders are 
permeable and multiple cultural identities coexist, whereas the second is fuelled by 
nationalistic sentiments and follows a state-centric logic. Whereas the first 
dynamic is broadly determined by the European institutions (European 
Commission, European Parliament) and the young civil society, the second 
dynamic is underlined by a Wespthalian logic that underlines a state-centric 
perspective where the state formally has absolute sovereignty over its territory and 
its borders are stable and hard and one single (national) culture predominates
23
. 
Therefore, this paradoxical mix reveals an entity (EU) that finds itself in a struggle 
for a stable identity. However, the EU is an actor that has not a definitive identity; 
it is still a young actor that finds itself in many conflicting situations when it is 
confronted with its external neighbours
24
. 
This is the case of the EU’s relations with the Former Soviet Republics. 
Basically it cannot have a coherent approach because of competing universalistic 
claims of the nation-state on one part and the supranational entity on the other part. 
These frictions determine not just a lack of coherence but also a clash of interests 
that sometimes they might be convergent and other times they might also be 
divergent. Therefore, as long as this conflicting dynamic will preserve, EU’s 
approach towards the Former Soviet Republics will not reflect unity and 
coordination but rather cleavages. However it is important to note that in specific 
situations like the Russian aggression, the European states might overlook the 
cleavages between them and offer a unitary position. A common threat or possible 
threat is an ingredient for a more cohesive posture.  
                                                
22
 J. Friedrichs, “The Meaning of New Medievalism”, European Journal of International Relations, 
vol. 7, no. 4, 2011, p. 475. 
23
 J. Zielonka, Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged EU, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2006, p. 10. 
24
 R. S. Ungureanu, “EU: A Polity in Search of a Mission?”, European Journal of Science and 
Theology, vol. 8, supplement 1, 2012, p. 16.  
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3. Future Dynamics  
Russia’s annexation of Crimea is an unprecedented step in Russia’s post-
Soviet foreign policy. Until Crimea, Russia had never formally annexed a territory 
belonging to another sovereign country recognized at an international level. Thus, 
Moscow’s willingness to violate international law in the face of clear warnings is a 
sign of Russia’s revisionism
25
. This is why further discussions on the possible 
future dynamics concerning the fate of the EU Eastern neighborhood in the 
aftermath of the Vilnius Summit should start from the new paradigm in which 
Russia is seen as a challenger of the West. 
Russia will continue to regard the post-Soviet neighbors as making up a 
Russian sphere of influence, where Moscow has what Russian Prime Minister 
Dmitry Medvedev, in 2008, termed ‘privileged interests’. As the president of 
Russia, Vladimir Putin once said the demise of the Soviet Union is ‘the greatest 
geopolitical catastrophe’ of the 20th century
26
. Therefore this sense of nostalgia 
offers a broader perspective on Putin’s aims towards Russia’s vicinity which 
consists in preserving a strong and undisturbed control on it. Moreover, his 
purpose offers a hierarchic image of the relations of Russia with its neighbours and 
the sovereignty of the last is rather a concept that has negotiated meaning, not a 
stable one. This special relationship between Russia and its neighbourhood 
impedes a firm approach of the EU towards the Former Soviet Republics.  
Another possible change could reside in Germany’s stance toward Russia. 
Moscow’s recent actions in Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea and the 
destabilization of eastern Ukraine, could cause rifts between Russia and Germany, 
despite continued economic and energy dependence. Anyway, the shift would not 
mean a complete reversal of Germany’s co-operative approach
27
.  
Regarding the perspectives of Ukraine and Republic of Moldova’s situations, 
it can be said that the EU will have a straightforward position towards them. As it 
is underlined in the paragraphs above, a common perceived threat might enhance a 
                                                
25
 J. Mankoff, “Russia’s Latest Land Grab. How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine”, Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 93, no. 3, 2014, pp. 60-68.  
26
 BBC,  “Putin deplores collapse of USSR”, 2005, accessed on April 2014 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm.   
27
 S. Meister, Reframing Germany’s Russia policy – an opportunity for the EU, European Council 
of Foreign Relations, Policy Brief, 2014, p. 8, accessed on April 2014 at http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR100_GERMANY_RUSSIA_BRIEF_AW.pdf. 
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coherent and unitary response of the EU towards its vicinity, especially Ukraine 
and the Republic of Moldova. This trend can be easily seen in the steps made in 
the last few weeks by the EU. First, on 21
st
 of March, the EU has signed the 
political provisions of an association agreement with Ukraine in Brussels
28
 and 
second, the citizens of the Republic of Moldova will be transferred to the list of 
third countries whose nationals are exempt from visa requirement
29
. This process 
will also be facilitated by the two countries and not just by the political will of the 
EU. As long as Ukraine and Republic of Moldova will feel threatened by Russia 
they will be eager to make significant compromises to converge with the European 
values. Therefore, this mutual empowering dynamics will just further close the 
gaps between the EU and Ukraine and Republic of Moldova bringing them closer 
to the initiation of the integration process.  
Concerning Armenia, as long as its security is guaranteed by Russia, it will 
endeavor to become a member of the Russian-led Customs Union as soon as 
possible. Armenia announced that it would join the Russian-led Customs Union, 
invoking security reasons related to the Karabakh conflict and the Turkish-
Armenian relations. The Armenian political elites assess the decision as being 
natural within the given geopolitical context and, at the same time, consider that an 
‘and-and principle’ consisting of the compatibility between the Association 
Agreements and the Customs Union should apply in its case. Since its 
announcement, Armenia is expediting the country’s accession to the Russian-led 
Customs Union. According to Minister of Economy Vagram Avanesyan, Armenia 
wants to sign the treaty of accession to the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Russia by the end of April
30
.  
In contrast with Armenia, Georgia decided to initiate the Association 
Agreement with the EU, including the DCFTA
31
. The Georgian officials perceive 
                                                
28
 RFE/RL, “EU Signs Association Agreement With Ukraine”, 2014, accessed on 26/04/2014 at 
http://www.rferl.org/content/eu-russia-ukraine/25304480.html.    
29
 Eureporter, “Commissioner Malmström on visa-free travel for citizens of Republic of Moldova”, 
2014, accessed on 26/04/2014 at http://www.eureporter.co/world/2014/04/27/commissioner-
malmstrom-on-visa-free-travel-for-citizens-of-republic-of-moldova/. 
30
 Panarmenian.net, “Armenia to sign Customs Union accession deal April 29”, 2014, accessed on 
April 2014 at http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/178088/.  
31
 “Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit”, Vilnius, 28-29 November 2013, accessed 
on April 2014 at http://www.eu2013.lt/en/news/statements/-joint-declaration-of-the-eastern-
partnership-summit-vilnius-28-29-november-2013.    
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this moment as consolidating and making irreversible the European integration 
process. Having the experience of a war with Russia in 2008, followed by 
Moscow’s recognition of Georgia’s separatist regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
the Georgian elites are totally committed to accept the EU’s integration initiative. 
For Georgia, the signing of Association Agreement and DCFTA consolidates the 
country’s ambition to join Europe, a direction underlined under the mandate of the 
former President Saakashvili and continued by the new leadership from Tbilisi. 
Just after the Vilnius Summit, the Georgian officials said that by initialing the 
Association Agreement ‘the European integration process became irreversible’ for 
Georgia
32
. Georgia has taken concrete steps to facilitate European integration and 
NATO membership. The parliamentary and presidential elections were freely and 
fairly held, there was a peaceful transition of power, the peaceful cohabitation 
process created a precedent given the fact that Georgia has never experienced this 
before. Georgian society and political class are determined to continue the pro-
Western course chose for their country, even if it disturbs Russia. 
Azerbaijan will maintain its European option and will keep requiring an 
agreement for establishing a special strategic partnership with the EU, in which the 
special formula of its relations with the EU that of a principal supplier of energy, 
will be quantified. At the Vilnius Summit, Azerbaijan signed a visa facilitation 
agreement, thus making easier and cheaper for Azerbaijani citizens to acquire 
short-stay visas, allowing them to travel freely to and throughout the EU
33
. Even if 
Azerbaijan didn’t initiate an Association Agreement with the EU, the visa 
agreement is important too, being a step further in the development of EU-
Azerbaijan relations.  
In addition, the Ukrainian crisis might lift Azerbaijan’s oil and gas profile. In 
the Azerbaijani press, analysts expressed the opinion that Azerbaijan would 
emerge as a winner in the Ukraine-Russia crisis. Being confronted with the risk of 
a possible Russian decision of cutting natural gas supplies to Europe or raising the 
prices, Azerbaijan's natural gas production might take in the future a new strategic 
                                                
32
 Civil.ge, “Georgian Prime Minister addresses Munich Security Conference”, 2014, accessed on 
April 2014 at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26904. 
33
 Council of the EU, “EU-Azerbaijan agreement on facilitating the issuing of visas”, Press Release, 
2013, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/1397 
59.pdf.   
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
meaning for Europe
34
. Moreover, the Trans-Caspian pipeline is a subject debated 
in the press. Analysts draw attention to the fact that the Russia-Ukraine crisis 
might create an opportunity for Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to become export 
partners. Because Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov paid an unexpected 
visit at the beginning of April to Baku, experts are of the opinion that Azerbaijan 
and Turkmenistan might come to an agreement over the creation of the Trans-
Caspian pipeline. If so, Europe’s energy export picture will look differently in the 
sense that Europe will reduce its dependency on Russia’s gas
35
.  
Conclusion 
As can be seen in the paragraphs above, the EU’s approach is not a coherent 
and uniform endeavor, but it is a process that has different dynamics and shapes 
influenced by a certain set of structural factors. In the first part, there were 
identified some major discrepancies between the EU’s policy towards the Balkans 
and its Eastern neighbours. Moreover, in the second part, there were emphasized 
the major structural causes that stay at the basis of the flawed approach of the EU 
towards its Eastern neighbours. This paper demonstrated that the endogenous 
factors played a decisive role for the success or failure of the EU’s behavior 
towards its vicinity. The last part was designed to offer some future perspectives 
on the Eastern neighbours based on the latest achievements and arguments 
discussed above. 
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